Reports of Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut, U. S. Army, commanding Fourth Division, Army of the Tennessee, including correspondence related to the Thirteenth Ohio Battery abandoning it's position and equipment during the battle
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE,
April 12, 1862
Capt. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General
SIR: I have the honor to report in brief the part taken by
my division in the battle of the 6th and 7th of April.
On Sunday morning, April 6, about 7.30 a.m., I received a
message from Brigadier-General Sherman that he was attacked in force, and
heavily, upon his left. I immediately ordered Col. J. C. Veatch, commanding the
Second Brigade, to proceed to the left of General Sherman. This brigade,
consisting of the Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Forty-sixth
Illinois, was in march in ten minutes, arrived on General Sherman's line
rapidly, and went into action. I must refer to Colonel Veatch's report for the
particulars of that day.
Receiving in a few moments a pressing request for aid from
Brigadier-General Prentiss, I took command in person of the First and Third
Brigades, respectively commanded by Col. N. G. Williams, of the Third Iowa, and
Brig. Gen. J. G. Lauman. The First Brigade consisted of the Third Iowa,
Forty-first Illinois, Twenty-eighth Illinois, and Thirty-second Illinois; the
Third Brigade, of the Thirty-first Indiana, Forty-fourth Indiana, Seventeenth
Kentucky, and Twenty-fifth Kentucky. In addition I took with me the First and
Second Battalions of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, Mann's light battery, four pieces,
commanded by First Lieut. E. Brotzmann; Ross' battery, Second Michigan, and
Myers' battery, Thirteenth Ohio. As we drew near the rear and left of General
Prentiss' line his regiments, in broken masses, drifted through my advance, that
gallant officer making every effort to rally them.
I formed my line of battle--the First Brigade thrown to the
front on the southerly side of a large open field, the Third Brigade continuing
the line with an obtuse angle around the other side of the field, and extending
some distance into the brush and timber; Mann's battery was placed in the angle
of the line, Ross' battery some distance to the left, and the Thirteenth Ohio
Battery on the right and somewhat advanced in cover of the timber, so as to
concentrate the fire upon the open ground in front---and waited for the attack.
A single shot from the enemy's batteries struck in Myers' Thirteenth Ohio
Battery, when officers and men, with a common impulse of disgraceful cowardice,
abandoned the entire battery, horses, caissons, and guns, and fled, and I saw
them no more until Tuesday. I called for volunteers from the artillery. The call
was answered, and 10 gallant men from Mann's battery and Ross' battery brought
in the horses, which were wild, and spiked the pieces. The attack commenced on
the Third Brigade, through the thick timber, and was met and repelled by a
steady and continuous fire, which rolled the enemy back in confusion, after some
half hour of struggle, leaving many dead and wounded.
The glimmer of bayonets on the left and front of the First
Brigade showed a large force of the enemy gathering, and an attack was soon made
on the Forty-first Illinois and Twenty-eighth on the left of the brigade, and
the Thirty-second Illinois and Third Iowa on the right. At the same time a
strong force of very steady and gallant troops formed in columns, doubled on the
center, and advanced over the open field in front. They were allowed to approach
within 400 yards, when fire was opened from Mann's and Ross' batteries, and from
the two right regiments of the First Brigade and the Seventeenth and
Twenty-fifth Kentucky, which were thrown forward slightly, so as to flank the
column. Under this withering fire they vainly attempted to deploy, but soon
broke and fell back under cover, leaving not less than 150 dead and wounded as
evidence how our troops maintained their position. The attack on the left was
also repulsed, but as the ground was covered with brush the loss could not be
judged.
General Prentiss having succeeded in rallying a considerable
portion of his command, I permitted him to pass to the front of the right of my
Third Brigade, where they redeemed their honor by maintaining that line for some
time while ammunition was supplied to my regiments. A series of attacks upon the
right and left of my line were readily repelled, until I was compelled to order
Ross' battery to the rear, on account of its loss in men and horses. During all
this time Mann's battery maintained its fire steadily, effectively, and with
great rapidity, under the excellent handling of Lieut. E. Brotzmann.
For five hours these brigades maintained their position under
repeated and heavy attacks, and endeavored, with their thin ranks, to hold the
space between Stuart and McClernand, and did check every attempt to penetrate
the line, when, about 3 o'clock, Colonel Stuart, on my left, sent me word that
he was driven in, and that I would be flanked on the left in a few moments. It
was necessary for me to decide at once to abandon either the right or left. I
considered that Prentiss could, with the left of General McClernand's troops,
probably hold the right, and sent him notice to reach out toward the right and
drop back steadily parallel with my First Brigade, while I rapidly moved General
Lauman's from the right to the left, and called up two 20-pounder pieces of
Major Cavender's battalion, to cheek the advance of the enemy upon the First
Brigade. These pieces were taken into action by Dr. Cornyn, the surgeon of the
battalion, and Lieutenant Edwards, and effectually checked the enemy for half an
hour, giving me time to draw off my crippled artillery and to form a new front
with the Third Brigade. In a few minutes two Texas regiments crossed the ridge
separating my line from Stuart's former one, while other troops also advanced.
Willard's battery was thrown into position, under command of Lieutenant Wood,
and opened with great effect upon the "Lone Star" flags, until their line of
fire was obstructed by the charge of the Third Brigade, which, after delivering
its fire with great steadiness, charged full up the hill and drove the enemy 300
or 400 yards. Perceiving that a heavy force was closing on the left, between my
line and the river, while heavy fire continued on the right and front, I ordered
the line to fall back. The retreat was made quietly and steadily and in good
order. I had hoped to make a stand on the line of my camp, but masses of the
enemy were pressing rapidly on each flank, while their light artillery was
closing rapidly in the rear. On reaching the 24-pounder siege guns in battery
near the river I again succeeded in forming line of battle in rear of the guns,
and, by direction of Major-General Grant, I assumed command of all troops that
came up. Broken regiments and disordered battalions came into line gradually
upon my division. Major Cavender posted six of his 20-pounder pieces on my
eight, and I sent my aide to establish the light artillery, all that could
found, on my left. Many officers and men unknown to me, and whom I never desire
to know, fled in confusion through the line. Many gallant soldiers and brave
officers rallied steadily on the new line.
I passed to the right and found myself in communication with
General Sherman and received his instructions. In a short time the enemy
appeared on the crest of the ridge, led by the Eighteenth Louisiana, but
were-cut to pieces by the steady and murderous fire of our artillery. Dr. Cornyn
again took charge of one of the heavy 24-pounders, and the line of fire of that
gun was the one upon which the other pieces con-centered. General Sherman's
artillery also was rapidly engaged, and after an artillery contest of some
duration the enemy fell back. Captain Gwin, U.S. Navy had called upon me by one
of his officers to mark the place the gunboats might take to open their fire. I
advised him to take position on the left of my camp ground and open fire as soon
as our fire was within that line. He did so, and from my own observation and the
statement of prisoners his fire was most effectual in stopping the advance of
the enemy on Sunday afternoon and night. About dark the firing ceased. I
advanced my division 100 yards to the front, threw out pickets, and officers and
men bivouacked in a heavy storm of rain.
About 12 p.m. General Nelson's leading columns passed through
my line and went to the front, and I called in my advance guard. The remnant of
my division was reunited, Colonel Veatch, with the Second Brigade, having joined
me about 4.30 p.m. It appears from his report, which I desire may be taken as
part of mine, that soon after arriving on the field of battle, in the morning,
the line of troops in front broke and fled through the lines of the Fifteenth
and Forty-sixth Illinois without firing a shot, and left the Fifteenth exposed
to a terrible fire, which they gallantly returned. Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis and
Major Goddard were killed here early in action, and the regiment fell back. The
same misfortune from the yielding of the front line threw the Forty-sixth
Illinois into confusion, and, although the fire was returned by the Forty-sixth
with great spirit, the opposing force drove back this unsupported regiment,
Colonel Davis in person bringing off the colors, in which gallant act he was
severely wounded. The Twenty-fifth Indiana and Fourteenth Illinois changed
front, and held their ground on the new alignment until ordered to form on the
left of General McClernand's command. The Fifteenth and Forty-sixth were
separated from the brigade, but fell into line with General McClernand's right.
The battle was sustained in this position, the left resting near my headquarters
until the left wing was driven in. The Second Brigade fell back towards the
river, and was soon followed by the First and Third, and reunited at the heavy
guns. This closes the history of Sunday's battle, so far as this division was
concerned.
On Monday, about 8 a.m., my division was formed in line close
to the river bank, and I obtained a few crackers for my men. About 9 a.m. I was
ordered by General Grant to move up to the support of General McClernand, then
engaged near his own camp. With the First Brigade and Mann's battery I moved
forward under the direction of Captain Rowley, aide-de-camp, and formed line on
the left of General McClernand's, with whom that brigade and battery remained
during the entire day, taking their full share of the varied fortunes of that
division in the gallant charges and the desperate resistance which checkered
that field. I am under great obligations to General McClernand for the honorable
mention he has personally given to my troops, and have no doubt that his
official report shows the same; and as they fought under his immediate eye, and
he was in chief command, I leave this to him.
The Second and Third Brigades went into action elsewhere, and
again I am compelled to refer to the report of their immediate commanders, only
saying that the Second Brigade led the charge ordered by General Grant until
recalled by Major-General Buell, and that the Third Brigade was deeply and
fiercely engaged on the right of General McClernand, successfully stopping a
movement to flank his right and holding their ground until the firing ceased.
About 1 -o'clock of that day (Monday) General McCook having closed up with
General McClernand and the enemy demonstrating in great force on the left, I
went, by the request of General McClernand, to the rear of his line to bring up
fresh troops, and was engaged in pressing them forward until the steady advance
of General Buell on the extreme left the firmness of the center and the closing
in from the right of Generals Sherman and Wallace determined the success of the
day, when I called in my exhausted brigades and led them to their camps. The
ground was such on Sunday that I was unable to use cavalry. Colonel Taylor's
Fifth Ohio Cavalry was drawn up in order of battle until near 1 o'clock, in hope
that some opening might offer for the use of this arm, and none appearing, I
ordered the command withdrawn from the reach of shot. They were not in action
again until the afternoon of Monday, when they were ordered to the front, but
returned to their camps. Their subsequent conduct will be no doubt reported by
the officer who conducted the special expedition of which they made a part. On
Sunday the cavalry lost 1 man killed, 6 wounded, and 8 horses before they were
withdrawn. The greater portion of Ross' battery were captured on Sunday in the
ravine near my camp.
For the officers and men of my division I am at a loss for
proper words to express my appreciation of their courage and steadiness. Where
all did their duty so well I fear to do injustice by specially naming any. The
fearful list of killed and wounded officers in my division shows the amount of
exposure which they met, while the returns of loss among the privates, who fell
unnamed but heroic, without the hope of special mention, shows distinctly that
the rank and file were animated by a true devotion and as firm a courage as
their officers. Colonel Williams, Third Iowa, commanding First Brigade, was
disabled early in the action of Sunday by a cannon-shot, which killed his horse
and paralyzed him, from which he has not yet fully recovered. The command of the
brigade devolved on Colonel Pugh, of the Forty-first Illinois, who held it
steadily and well through the entire battle. Colonel Pugh desires special
mention to be made of Lieut. F. Sessions, of Third Iowa, acting assistant
adjutant-general. My own observations confirm his report, and I recommend
Lieutenant Sessions to the favorable consideration of the Department. Col. A. K.
Johnson, of Twenty-eighth Illinois, was under my own eye during both days. I
bear willing testimony to his perfect coolness and through handling of his
regiment throughout the whole timer and to the fact that his regiment halted as
a rear guard on Sunday afternoon during the retreat by his personal order and
reported to me for orders before he closed into the line. Colonel Logan, of the
Thirty-second, was severely wounded on Sunday; the lieutenant-colonel of the
Forty-first fell about the same time, both in discharge of duty. So great were
the casualties among officers, that the Third Iowa Regiment went into action on
Monday in command of a first lieutenant. To Colonel Veatch, commanding the
Second Brigade, my thanks are due for the skill with which he handled his
brigade on detached duty, and I refer to his report for the conduct and special
notice of his officers. The Government, as I am informed, has recognized his
former services by promotion ; if not, he has won it now. Brig. Gen. J. G.
Lauman, commanding the Third Brigade, took command only the day before the
battle. The brigade and their commander know each other now. I saw him hold the
right of my line on Sunday with his small body of gallant men, only 1,717
strong, for three hours, and then, when changed over to the left, repel the
attack of twice his force for a full hour of terrible fighting, closing by the
most gallant and successful charge, which gave him time to draw off his force in
order and comparative safety. His report renders full justice to his officers,
among whom Colonel Reed, of the Forty-fourth Indiana, was especially
distinguished.
My own thanks have been personally tendered on the field of
battle to First Lieut. E. Brotzmann, commanding Mann's battery, and to his
command. This battery fought both days under my personal inspection. It was
always ready, effective in execution, changing position promptly when required,
and officers, men, and horses steady in action. Having lost one piece on Sunday,
it was easy to distinguish the fire of this battery throughout Monday; in
position first on General McClernand's right, then on his center, then on the
left, they everywhere fulfilled their duty. I specially recommend this officer
for promotion. Captain Mann, of this battery, was unable to be in action. I
recommend that the officers of the Thirteenth Ohio Battery be mustered out of
service, and that the men and material remaining may be applied to rifling up
the ranks of some battery which has done honor to the service.
My personal thanks are due to my personal staff. Capt. S. D.
Atkins, acting assistant adjutant-general, rose from a sick bed, and was with me
until I ordered him to the rear. He was absent about three hours, and returned
and remained throughout the battle. Lieut. J. C. Long, Ninth Regular Infantry,
my aide, was peculiarly active, energetic, and daring in conveying my orders
under heavy fire. He was fortunate in receiving no wound, although one ball
passed through his cap and one through his sleeve. Lieutenant Benner, my acting
assistant quartermaster, acted as aide with great coolness and courage, and had
his horse killed under him. Lieut. W. H. Dorchester joined me as volunteer aide
on Sunday, and rendered valuable aid on Monday.
I add statement of killed, wounded, and missing of the artillery so far as
reported.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. A. HURLBUT,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIV., DIST. OF WEST TENN.,
In Camp below Memphis, Tenn., August 18, 1862
Maj. JOHN; A. RAWLINS, A. A. G., Dist. of West Tenn., Corinth, Miss.
MAJOR: In obedience to special orders front Headquarters
Army of the Tennessee, not numbered, bearing date 10th June. 1862, directing me
to investigate and report in relation to a certain letter from one "B. Stanton,"
dated May 15, 1862, to General C. P. Buckingham, and also as to a certain
anonymous article published in some obscure paper in Ohio and copied into
another of equal obscurity, I have the honor to report:
That on Friday, the 4th day of April, A. D. 1862, Captain
Myers, of the Thirteenth Ohio Battery, reported for duty with the Fourth
Division at Pittsburg, in place of Burrows' Fourteenth Ohio Battery, removed
from my division to that of Major-General McClernand. They were camped on the
left of my line, and put in immediate charge of Captain Mann, of the Missouri
artillery, who, as senior officer of that arm, had charge as chief of artillery.
They were cared for as others of the division, and I think no complaint on that
score has ever come from my command.
On the 6th April, when the First and Third Brigades moved
forward to support General Prentiss, this battery, together with Mann's and
Ross', were ordered forward. The others promptly obeyed. Either from ignorance
or some other cause the Thirteenth Ohio was very slow in coming forward, and was
brought up by repeated orders through my aides.
I ordered Captain Myers to come into battery on the reverse slope of a crest of
ground, where there was cover for his horses and caissons in front of the right
of my infantry, which was in line of battle about 150 yards in his rear.
The battery was further supported by a cross-fire from Mann's
battery and Ross' battery, placed about 400 yards to due left, and by the fire
of the First Brigade, lying immediately behind the last-named batteries and
extending to the right and left of them.
The spot selected was in an open grove of large trees, and,
had Captain Meyers or any of his officers understood anything of their duty, as
safe a position for field artillery as could be. It was easy also to retire
from, as there were but 100 yards of open woods to pass over before he would be
in rear of the infantry and also upon a good road. But Captain Myers, in
endeavoring to place his guns, brought them rather too far forward, so as to
lose the advantage of the slope; still the position was not as much exposed as
that of Mann's battery, which was in the open field.
Having given these preliminary statements, I now copy from my
official report, and reaffirm that every word of it in relation to this battery
is true:
A single shot from the enemy's batteries struck in Myers' Thirteenth Ohio Battery, when officers and men, with a common impulse of disgrace fill cowardice, abandoned the entire battery, horses, caissons, and guns, and fled, and I saw them no more until Tuesday.
I further state that the charge made by the anonymous
scribbler and indorsed by B. Stanton, that the infantry supports fell back, is
utterly false.
The Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky and Forty-fourth
Indiana, then serving with me, now detached, were the nearest regiments, and
neither they nor any other regiment or part of a regiment yielded an inch for
many hours after the cowards, who disgraced their State and their flag, had
deserted their comrades.
That they were exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery
is true, and as long as the laws of optics remain I confess that I know no way
in which field artillery can see an enemy's battery and do execution without
being liable to be seen and reached by them. I have always supposed that
artillery were expected to meet artillery, and it has been left for this age of
invention and for the State of Ohio to produce military critics, one of whom
complains on one occasion that artillery did not support the infantry against
infantry, and the other--B. Stanton--that infantry did not support artillery
against artillery. They were never exposed for one moment to infantry fire and
lost but one man.
If their position was untenable (which it was not), they
could have safely retired; but it was a panic, and they ran.
That officers and men were ignorant of duty and of drill I
have no doubt. The responsibility of that rests elsewhere. The paper hereto
appended, marked A, shows some of the reasons of this ignorance. During the two
days of the battle Captain Myers was not heard from, and was probably skulking
beneath the bank of the Landing.
On Tuesday, the 8th, when danger was over and rations were
needed, he appeared. I required of him some explanation of his conduct. At last
I obtained from him the papers hereto annexed, marked B, which sets up none of
the circumstances that he and his false friends now set up as a palliation for
notorious cowardice and the grounds of all attack on men who have not failed to
risk their lives. These papers of themselves are sufficient. (attached papers
not found)
Inasmuch as by the order of Major-General Grant I am
instructed to append the statement of other officers cognizant of the facts, I
have requested those who had a view of these transactions to make their
statements and transmit them to you. These statements are appended. (attached
statements not found)
In short, the transaction was seen by 4,000 brave men, who
never showed their backs to the enemy, and was altogether too palpable to be
passed over or equivocated upon. Captain Myers was informed of my official
report, was informed of the order mustering him out of service, offered no
defense or explanation, made no protests, demanded no trial, for he knew well
that such conduct as his would be visited with but one penalty and that the
highest.
The order disbanding the battery was made by Major-General
Halleck upon my official report. His authority for so doing I never inquired
into, but leave it for newspaper scribblers and their hangers-on to determine. I
obeyed it, and know it to be just, and not only just, but merciful. I inclose
herewith copies of all correspondence on the subject in my possession.
I have now done with the official part of this
correspondence, but hope to be pardoned if I touch upon the character of these
sweeping and nameless accusations. The cowardly slanderer that wrote the
article, and the more contemptible official who indorses it as capable of proof,
either have published what they knew to be willful falsehood or have published
slander without knowing or caring whether it be true or not. In either event
they are beneath the notice of a gentleman. I simply say that the statements
contained in my official report are true, and if these wiseacres know anything,
they know the penalty that belongs to a false official statement.
If for mere purposes of local popularity an office-hunter by
profession is allowed to annoy officers who are still in the presence of the
enemy, and who for months have guarded the approaches to the quiet corners where
these insects spin their web, it is too much. This man, B. Stanton, I suppose to
be the great mania over all neighborhoods, whom the people of Ohio, for their
sins, have elected lieutenant-governor, and who has already been condemned to
eternal infamy by Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman. It is among the inflictions and evils
of a popular government that sometimes scum of this sort issues to the top in
times of agitation, and, instead of being skimmed off and put with other
rubbish, dances out his hour of apparent vigor on the summit of the popular
effervescence. The scum, no doubt, think that their movement is a proof of their
own power; but it only shows how strongly the popular feeling boils, at the same
time shave and pander to popular prejudice, on the alert to find material to
build up temporary prestige by appeals to the base and unworthy with the cant of
"an enlightened public" with their months, while they mock its hunger with
stones or feed it with poison; slaves, that recognize no personal manhood;
cowards, who do not know that to the brave the suspicion even of cowardice is
worse than death; cheats, that keep the word of promise to the ear and break it
to the hope; and sophistical fools, that do not know that a lie, however well
told, is sure in the end to be over-taken and conquered by invincible truth. Men
who have acquired position by skill in manufacturing caucuses, by newspaper
falsehoods, by temporary tricks and devices, and all the machinations of party;
not by service rendered in field or senate; not by manly, straightforward,
independent thought, word, or act. These are among the thousand insects that now
infest our Republic, and chief among these is the conceited liar and willing
slanderer B. Stanton who degrades the gallant State of Ohio by being her
lieutenant-governor. Does not this wretched substitute know that his time does
not come until his superior officer is out of the way? It is for the Governor,
not his deputy, to vindicate the wrongs of the Ohio troops. This fifth wheel has
nothing to do with it. I have stood within sight and within hearing of Ohio
troops during two days of that eventful battle. I saw them fight as well as
others, but when I find men under my command who disgrace their uniform and
peril the rest of my command by open and notorious cowardice, shall I allow this
black spot to stand un-remarked because the cowards hailed from Ohio, and thus
bring cowardice and courage on the same level! It was my duty as an officer to
mark them with distinct condemnation. I did it. If I reported falsely, I am
answerable. It was the duty of the major-general to punish, and he did it
mercifully, and I do know that if Captain Myers should demand a court-martial he
would be shot, and he knows it, and knew it when he penned the letter referred
to me.
With great respect, major, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
S. A. HURLBUT,
Brigadier-General, Comdg. Fourth Division, Dist. of West Tenn.
Text
Source - The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
Image Source - The Library of Congress
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