Reports of Brigadier General Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding Department of North Carolina.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA,
New Berne, April 10, 1862
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington
1 have the honor to make the following detailed report of the
battle of New Berne, as promised in my hurried report of the 16th ultimo:
After embarking my command, consisting of the brigades of
Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke, at Roanoke Island on the morning of the 11th,
the transport fleet, in conjunction with the naval fleet, arrived without
accident off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, in the Neuse River, some 16 miles from
New Berne, on the evening of the 12th, where we anchored for the night. Soon
after anchoring I called the three general officers in council, and after
consultation with Commodore Rowan we decided to land at the mouth of Slocum's
Creek on the following morning under cover of the naval guns, and proceed up the
direct road to New Berne our advance to be designated by signal rockets from the
head of the column, thus enabling the Navy and our armed transport vessels to
shell the road in advance of us.
At 6.30 the following morning I hoisted the preparatory
signal. The naval vessels, with the gunboat Picket, moved in toward the mouth of
the creek and shelled the woods some distance in advance of us. A reconnaissance
was made to ascertain the depth of water by the gunboat Delaware, Captain
Quackenbush, and by Mr. H. H. Helper, with the boat's crew of the Alice Price.
After receiving their reports the signal for landing was hoisted, the
light-draught steamers and surf-boats having been previously filled with our
men, and in twenty minutes some three regiments were on shore. The steamers
having grounded, the men on them leaped overboard and waded to the shore,
holding their cartridge-boxes out of the water. The enthusiasm with which this
work was accomplished cannot be excelled. As the colors of each regiment were
planted on the shore the men rallied to them, and their proper formations were
soon made. The steamers and boats returned to the fleet for more troops, and the
landing was continued, under the direction of my chief quartermaster, Capt.
Herman Biggs, until the whole force detailed for the attack had reached the
shore except the field artillery and some of the infantry that had not arrived
from Hatteras Inlet.
In the mean time I had landed my staff, and detailed Capt. R.
S. Williamson, Topographical Engineer, to move on in advance of the column for
the purpose of reconnoitering the positions of the enemy. I detailed my aides
Lieutenants Pell and Fearing to accompany him, and requested him to call on
General Foster for two of his aides, and Lieutenants Strong and Pendleton were
detailed to accompany him.
The six naval boat howitzers, under command of Lieutenant
McCook, having landed, I ordered a detail of a regiment from General Reno's
brigade to assist in hauling them over the road, which was so bad that it was
impossible for them to be dragged by the gunners. The Fifty-first Pennsylvania
was detailed for this service. I then moved on to the head of the column, and
found it had reached the first intrenchment at Otter Creek, some 6 miles up,
which had been deserted by the enemy. Captain Williamson, having discovered this
fact and previously reported it to General Foster, proceeded on with his party
to make a further reconnaissance. After obstructing the railroad at this point,
I ordered General Foster to move up the main county road with his brigade and
General Reno to move his brigade up the railroad, leaving orders for General
Parke to follow with his brigade up the county road. Soon after starting the
columns Captain Williamson reported to me that a line of breastworks, broken by
a redan for field pieces, along the bank of the river a mile in advance, had
also been deserted by the enemy. I visited this work, accompanied by Generals
Foster and Reno, where we communicated with the fleet.
Overtaking the head of the column, the march was continued
until my own staff' officers and those of the different brigades who were acting
as escort to Captain Williamson came in contact with the enemy's pickets. It
then being nearly 8 o'clock, I ordered a halt, and directed General Foster to
bivouac on the right and left of the county road in a line at right angles to
it, ordering one regiment to occupy the road leading down to the fortifications
on the river. General Reno's brigade occupied a corresponding advanced position
across the railroad a half mile to the left and General Parke occupied a
position immediately in rear of and parallel with General Foster. It rained all
night, as it had done during the day, so that our men passed a most cheerless
night. The Fifty-first Pennsylvania, with the naval boat howitzers, under
Lieutenant McCook, together with two guns landed from the Cossack and
Highlander, under Captains Bennett and Dayton, did not reach my headquarters
till 3 o'clock in the morning. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the officers
and men who performed this very arduous service, as these eight pieces
constituted our entire artillery force during the engagement of the next day.
Soon after leaving the landing I determined not to land the
light batteries of Captains Belger and Morris and our wagons at Slocum's Creek,
and sent an order to Captain Biggs to move up the river and land them at the
deserted intrenchment above the mouth of Otter Creek, but the dense fog that
prevailed during the afternoon and night made it impossible to land anything,
and it was equally impossible to communicate from shore with the fleet by
signals, as agreed upon.
On the following morning I ordered Captain Williamson to move
forward and reconnoiter the position of the enemy, which was known to be not far
in advance of our pickets, from information obtained during the night from
negroes and others, to the effect that they were posted behind a long line of
intrenchments leading from the river across the county road to the railroad. The
brigades were formed and ordered to advance as follows: General Foster to move
up the county road and attack the enemy's front and left, General Reno to move
up the railroad and, if possible, turn the enemy's right, and General Parke to
move up the county road as a reserve. I also ordered General Parke to detail the
Eleventh Connecticut to relieve the Fifty-first Pennsylvania in dragging up the
boat howitzers, and their work was done in an efficient and prompt manner. The
head of the columns very soon came within range of the enemy's artillery, and
the following dispositions were made: General Foster placed the Twenty-fifth
Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, and the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts, Colonel
Stevenson, in line of battle on the right of the county road parallel with the
enemy's intrenchments; the six navy boat howitzers, under Lieutenant McCook,
with the howitzers of Captains Dayton and Bennett, across the road, and the
Twenty-seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, and the Twenty-third Massachusetts,
Colonel Kurtz, in line of battle on the left of the road.
The enemy then opened fire, both musketry and artillery, upon
General Foster's lines. General Reno then, moving briskly forward with his
brigade along the railroad, ordered a charge of the right wing of the
Twenty-first Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, on the brick-kiln, just in
the rear of the main line of intrenchments, which was entirely successful. He at
the same time ordered the left wing of the Twenty-first Massachusetts, Major
Rice; the Fifty-first New York, Colonel Ferrero; the Ninth New Jersey, Colonel
Heckman, into line of battle on the left of the railroad, with a view of
supporting the Twenty-first Massachusetts, holding the Fifty-first Pennsylvania,
Colonel Hartranft, in reserve; but he soon found that instead of the enemy's
right being on the railroad it extended to a point some three-quarters of a mile
beyond, and they were posted along the whole line in a series of redans
separated from him by fallen trees and an almost impassable swamp. He soon found
himself engaged along the whole line, and was unable to support Colonel Clark,
who was soon after compelled to return from the brick-kiln from the attack of an
overwhelming force. General Foster ordered the Tenth Connecticut, Colonel Drake,
to interline on the left of the Twenty-third Massachusetts. I then ordered
General Parke's brigade to take a position in the intermediate space between
General Foster and General Reno, and to support whichever brigade needed it. His
brigade was formed in the following order, beginning at the left: The Fourth
Rhode Island, Colonel Rodman; the Eighth Connecticut, Colonel Harland; the Fifth
Rhode Island, Major Wright. The Eleventh Connecticut, which had brought up the
boat howitzers, I held as reserve. Soon after this, learning from General Foster
that the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts had exhausted its ammunition, I ordered
the Eleventh Connecticut, Colonel Mathewson, to report to General Foster for
their support.
The engagement was now general all along the whole line. It
had been previously ascertained, by the reconnaissance of Captain Williamson,
that the enemy had many pieces of field artillery behind their intrenchments,
and on their left flanks there was a river battery with four 32-pounders, pivot
guns, which enfiladed our lines. Having ordered to General Foster the last of my
reserve, I sent word to General Parke to push on through the timber and pass the
enemy's right. I then proceeded to the left of our lines to communicate with
General Reno, where I found his brigade very hotly engaged with the enemy.
In the mean time Colonel Rodman, of the Fourth Rhode Island,
had met Colonel Clark, of the Twenty-first Massachusetts, who informed him that
he could get in rear of the enemy's intrenchments by charging down the railroad
directly upon the brick-kiln, which he at once did, under a galling fire from
the rifle pits in front of General Reno, and was supported by the remainder of
the brigade, by order of General Parke, planting their colors upon the parapet.
The brigade then moved rapidly down the line of
intrenchments, the Fourth Rhode Island leading, clearing it of the enemy as they
advanced and capturing their guns. General Foster, seeing our forces inside of
the enemy's lines, immediately ordered his brigade to charge, when the whole
line of breastwork between the railroad and the river were by this combined
movement of the two brigades most gallantly carried, the enemy retreating in the
greatest possible confusion. After the cheers of our men had subsided it was
discovered from the sharp firing on our left that General Reno was still engaged
with the enemy, upon which General Parke moved back, with a view, if possible,
of getting in the rear of the enemy's forces in the intrenchments to the left of
the railroad. General Foster also moved forward with one of his regiments
farther to the right, with a view to getting in their rear. General Parke,
having reached an advantageous position to the right of the brick-kiln and in
rear of the redans, by a heavy fire very much staggered the enemy, when General
Reno ordered the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Hartranft, to charge the
enemy's line, which charge was supported by the remainder of his brigade,
causing the enemy to desert his works in great confusion.
At this juncture General Foster appeared in their rear with
one of his regiments, thus cutting off their retreat, and received from Colonel
Avery an unconditional surrender of himself and over 200 men. The Twenty-first
Massachusetts was left in charge of the prisoners. The remaining force at that
point moved along the railroad directly for New Berne. In the mean time I had
conducted the four regiments of General Foster's brigade on the county road in
pursuit of the enemy, and at the crossing of the county road and railroad the
column came together, General Foster's brigade consolidated and moved on,
General Reno's brigade following. I ordered General Parke's brigade to follow
the county road, and if possible save the bridge over the Trent from
destruction. I then joined the head of General Foster's brigade, and soon after
discovered that the railroad bridge and part of the city were on fire. Upon
arriving at the head of the bridge I halted the brigades, and after visiting the
city, in company with Generals Foster and Reno and consulting with Commodore
Rowan, I ordered General Foster to move across to the city and occupy it. Having
discovered that the draw of the county bridge had been destroyed, I sent an
order to General Parke to proceed no farther, but to bivouac for the night.
Of what has happened since that time I have already sent you
detailed accounts. For a more perfect understanding of the exact movements of
the different brigades I beg to refer you to the very accurate reports of my
brigadier-generals. I also beg to refer you to the report of Captain Williamson
and to the accompanying sketch for a more accurate knowledge of the nature and
position of the enemy's intrenchments as well as our own position in the battle.
The endurance and courage displayed by our officers and men from the moment they
landed at Slocum's Creek until they reached New Berne was beyond anything I
could have expected. The road from the landing to Croatan, a distance of 6
miles, was newly cut, and consequently almost impassable, and continually
rendered worse by the rain, the march of the troops, and the wheels of the
artillery.
I have before mentioned that the rear of the column, with the artillery, did not
reach our position in front of the enemy's until 3 o'clock in the morning. Both
officers and men bivouacked in the open fields and swamps in order of battle,
catching such rest as they could, the rain falling constantly during the night..
At daylight the next morning the regiments were in line, and soon the brigades
commenced filing off to take their positions closer to the enemy's works. When I
started from my headquarters for the head of the column I felt that we were
going to the fight under most unfavorable circumstances, and expected to find
the men fagged and leg-weary, but as I passed regiment after regiment their
hearty cheers and firm step convinced me that I had underestimated them.
On reaching the turn in the road where they first came under
fire of the enemy's cannon the only change I could perceive in their demeanor
was an over-anxiety to keep their ranks well closed, and they filed to their
positions, under the direction of their brigadier-generals, with all the
regularity and steadiness of veteran soldiers. For more than three hours the
contest continued, the fog being so dense at times that the position of the
enemy could only be ascertained by the rattle of their musketry and the roar of
artillery. The result has proved what work they can do under such trying
circumstances. In the midst of all the privations since we left Fortress Monroe
the most marked feature that has been demonstrated in the character of these men
is their extreme patience. With men of less patience and subordination the work
could not have been accomplished.
I cannot mention personal instances of gallantry where all have behaved so
nobly. To the reports of Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke, who were always with
their brigades in the thickest of the fight, as well as to the reports of the
colonels of the regiments, who commanded by example as well as authority, I beg
to refer you for details. To them and their brave officers and men the country
owes every success which has been obtained during the campaign, and I am sure
their services are appreciated.
By the inclosed report of Brigade Surg. W. H. Church, our
medical director, it will be seen that our loss was overestimated in my hasty
report the day after the battle. The accompanying lists show 88 killed and 352
wounded. Among these names are some of our most valuable officers and men. They
are sad losses to us and to their relatives and friends. They nobly gave up
their lives in defense of their country, and a debt of gratitude is due from
every American citizen to the wives, mothers, and fathers who have laid such
sacrifices on the altar of their country. They have my heartfelt sympathy, and I
constantly pray that but few more such sacrifices will be required for the
breaking up of this unholy rebellion. The memories of the brave dead will ever
be green in the hearts of their countrymen and the scars of the wounded will be
honorable passports for them through life.
As indicated in the beginning of my report, the plan of attack contemplated the
co-operation of the Navy, which was most successfully carried out. As we moved
along the road their shells fell in advance of us, and as we approached the rear
of each rebel fortification their shells dropped inside the parapets, and by
this combined movement the enemy was forced to fly in the-greatest confusion. In
this instance as well as in every other where it has been needed the most
perfect understanding and co-operation have existed between the two arms of the
service since we joined the naval fleet at Hatteras Inlet. I need hardly say
that these brave officers and sailors are bound to us by the strongest ties of
friendship and companionship in arms.
The armed transports of the fleet in this instance, as in
every other, have shown that they have been most efficiently managed, and in
speaking of the services of this command I always include all the transports of
the fleet. The gunboat Picket, Capt. T. P. Ives, rendered marked service in this
engagement as well as at Roanoke and elsewhere.
The duties of the officers and attendants of the medical
staff have been most arduous both during and since the battle and most nobly
have they fulfilled their mission, displaying in all instances both skill and
courage.
Some of the results of this battle may be enumerated as
follows: The capture of nine forts, with forty-one heavy guns; two miles of
intrenchments, with nineteen field pieces; six 32-pounders not in position; over
300 prisoners; over 1,000 stand of small-arms; tents and barracks for 10,000
troops; a large amount of ammunition and army supplies; an immense amount of
naval stores, for which I refer you to Commodore Rowan's report; the second
commercial city in the State of North Carolina; the entire command of the
Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds; the capture of Beaufort, Carolina, and Morehead
Cities, and the complete investment of Fort Macon, which we hope soon to reduce.
The prisoners belonging to this city I have released on their parole, together
with the sick and wounded. The remainder, some 160, I have sent to New York. I
hope my course in releasing the sick and wounded and the citizens of this place
will meet the approval of the Department, and I should have been glad to have
released them all had the enemy fulfilled their engagement made with me when I
released the Roanoke prisoners.
I cannot close this report without paying a just tribute of
praise to the members of my staff, who have so nobly aided me in every effort in
the accomplishment of this work. Dr. Church, after designating the positions for
hospitals and performing other duties devolving upon him as medical director,
rendered me most efficient service in directing troops and carrying orders.
Captain Richmond, my assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenants Pell and
Fearing accompanied me on the field, where they displayed great gallantry and
skill.
Capt. Herman Biggs, my chief quartermaster, rendered most
important service in directing the debarkation of troops and the movement of our
supply transports. From the organization of this expedition in New York last
September his work has been arduous and unremitting, and the fact that no call
for anything which appertains to his department has been unsatisfied is
sufficient evidence of the efficiency with which he has performed his work. He
has been and was in this instance most nobly seconded by Captains Cutting and
Loring. Capt. R. S. Williamson, chief topographical engineer, made some most
daring reconnaissances, and by his skill and courage has commanded the respect
of and endeared himself to the whole command. Capt. E. R. Goodrich, my chief
commissary, and Captain D'Wolf, in this instance as in all others, have shown
marked efficiency in the discharge of the duties of their department under the
most trying circumstances. Lieutenant Flagler, my chief ordnance officer, has
constantly managed his department with great skill, and rendered most important
aid in this instance. My private secretaries, Messrs. Larned and French, here as
at Roanoke, accompanied the army on the field, ever ready to perform the duties
required of them.
I mentioned in my first dispatch that the loss of the enemy
was less than our own, but subsequent information has convinced me that it was
much greater; that a large number of their killed and wounded were carried off
in the cars there is no doubt, but in the absence of accurate information I
refrain from making an estimate. It is never a source of pleasure to me to
exaggerate the loss on either side, and could the same results have been
obtained without the loss of a man it would have been a source of great
gratification. Happily I have the opportunity of decreasing my former estimate
of our own loss.
I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,
A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General, Commanding Department North Carolina.
Text
Source - The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
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